A parallel account of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste
AbstractEpistemic modals (might, must) and predicates of personal taste (tasty, fun) show parallel behavior related to whose knowledge or taste is relevant for their interpretation. To account for the similarity, I extend Lasersohn’s (2005) account of predicates of personal taste to epistemic modals, using his “judge” parameter for the person whose knowledge is relevant. Along the way, I argue for modifications to Lasersohn’s view. I also propose a way to place the account in a Stalnakerian theory of conversation.
How to Cite
Stephenson, T. (2019). A parallel account of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung, 11, 583-597. https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2007.v11i0.666
Copyright (c) 2019 Tamina Stephenson
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