Partial Semantics for Iterated if-Clauses
AbstractThis paper argues in favor of a partial semantics for indicative conditionals, along the lines of a proposal made by Belnap in the seventies: conditionals only have a truth value if their antecedent is true, and in this case, their truth value equals the truth value of their consequent. I argue that this semantics offers a way outof the impasse following Gibbard’s (1981) famous proof that if φ→(ψ→χ) and (φ∧ψ)→χ are equivalent, →cannot be stronger than material implication.
How to Cite
Huitink, J. (2019). Partial Semantics for Iterated if-Clauses. Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung, 13(1), 187-202. https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2009.v13i1.526
Copyright (c) 2019 Janneke Huitink
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