A propositionalist semantics for imagination and depiction reports

Abstract

We present a formal semantics for physical and mental depiction reports (e.g. Penny is painting a penguin, Uli is imagining a unicorn) that interprets the complements of these reports as propositionally coded situations. Our semantics improves upon Zimmermann’s (2016) property-based semantics for such reports (see Zimmermann, 1993) by blocking unwarranted inferences to a common objective and by capturing the semantic interaction of DPs and CPs in depiction complements. At the same time, it preserves the merits of Zimmermann’s semantics, especially the compositional interpretation of depiction reports and the ability to account for missing de dicto-readings of reports with a strong quantificational object DP. Our semantics shows that – contrary to the received view (e.g. Forbes, 2006; Zimmermann, 2016) – depiction complements are not evidence against a propositionalist analysis of attitude complements.