Signalling games select Horn strategies
AbstractIn this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressions typically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn’s division of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is a conventional fact that we use language this way. This convention will be explained in terms of equilibria of signalling games introduced by Lewis (1969) but now in an evolutionary setting. I will also relate this signalling game analysis with Blutner’s (2000) bi-directional optimality theory and with Parikh’s (1991, 2000) game-theoretical analysis of successful communication.
How to Cite
van Rooy, R. (2019). Signalling games select Horn strategies. Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung, 6, 289-310. https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2002.v6i0.833
Copyright (c) 2019 Robert van Rooy
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