Truth, Belief and Knowledge in Epistemic Logic

  • Daniel Vanderveken

Abstract

Standard logic tends to reduce propositions to their truth conditions. However propositions with the same truth conditions are not the contents of the same thoughts just as they are not the senses of synonymous sentences. I will first define a much finer criterion of propositional identity that takes into account predications that we make in expressing propositions. In my view, propositions have a structure of constituents. We ignore in which possible circumstances most propositions are true because we ignore real denotations of their attributes and concepts. In understanding them we just know that their truth in each circumstance is compatible with certain possible denotation assignments to their constituents and incompatible with others. So propositions have possible in addition to real truth conditions. I will explain why strictly equivalent propositions can have a different cognitive value. I will define the notion of truth according to an agent and a strong propositional implication that is known a priori. I will also formulate a logic of belief that is compatible with philosophy of mind. Human agents are minimally rather than perfectly rational in my logic. Epistemic paradoxes are solved.
Published
2019-08-20
How to Cite
Vanderveken, D. (2019). Truth, Belief and Knowledge in Epistemic Logic. Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung, 9, 489-506. https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2005.v9i0.783