Remarks on Grimshaw’s Clausal Typology
AbstractIn this paper the question is raised whether Grimshaw’s clause type feature [E] is necessary to capture Generalizations I and II. Generalization I follows directly from independently motivated presuppositions of surprise-predicates once the (nonstandard) assumption is made that polar interrogatives are singleton sets of proposition. The first part of this paper thus constitutes an argument for this approach to polar interrogatives. In fn. 9 we note that this approach to polar interrogatives also solves one of Krifka’s objections to the proposition set approach to questions – which constitutes a second argument. Generalization II also seems to be analyzable in terms of presuppositions, those of wonder-predicates and intensified questions. D’Avis’ intuition that intensified questions are defective appears to lead to a workable result once d’Avis specific implementation is abandoned. A new argument for this view comes from the fact that filters for presuppositions interact in the expected way with acceptability judgments.
How to Cite
Abels, K. (2019). Remarks on Grimshaw’s Clausal Typology. Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung, 9, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2005.v9i0.714
Copyright (c) 2019 Klaus Abels
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/