AbstractHow can identity sentences involving distinct names be informative? Any theory of names facing the problem of informativity will need to appeal to descriptions. The crucial question is: at which level do descriptions play a role? Kripke showed that descriptions neither constitute nor fix the semantic contents of names. At the same time, his Millian views imply the problematic existence of modal illusions: some necessary truths are knowable only aposteriori even though there is no possible world in which they don’t hold. I sketch a new, metasemantic strategy that purports to avoid modal illusions within a referentialist framework: the relevant descriptions describe not extensions (descriptivism), not intensions (twodimensionalism), but names themselves (three-dimensionalism).
How to Cite
Bochner, G. (2019). Three-Dimensional Semantics. Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung, 13(1), 77–92. https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2009.v13i1.499