Do we need two uniqueness conditions? A reply to Lewis (2022)

Abstract

This paper revisits the long-standing issue of how uniqueness and anaphoricity interact in definite descriptions, particularly the disappearance of the uniqueness effect when a definite description is used anaphorically. Over years of research, two types of uniqueness conditions have been proposed to account for this effect: the individual uniqueness condition and the discourse uniqueness condition. Recently, Lewis (2022) has argued that both are necessary for a comprehensive explanation. However, this paper challenges the necessity of positing two distinct uniqueness conditions. Instead, we argue that grounding the individual uniqueness condition within dynamic semantics (Beaver and Coppock 2015; Köpping 2020) provides a more adequate account. While we disgree with the core premise of Lewis’ dual-uniqueness analysis, we concur with her view that dyanmicness is essential for understanding the interaction between uniqueness and anaphoricity.