





































unless (30) is implemented with familiar semantic toolboxes. Therefore, one avenue for future research is to pursue how to formalize the descriptive generalization in (30).

Finally, given that the proposed semantics is independent of evidence-type specification, it is potentially applicable to evidentials with other evidence-types. In fact, it is compatible with typical direct evidence, which is expressed with the Tibetan direct evidential ‘*dug* (the data are from Kalsang et al., 2013):

- (36) a. Visual  
 bKra.shis stod.gos sngon po zhig.gyon ‘dug  
 Tashi shirt blue a wear ‘dug  
 ‘Tashi is wearing a blue shirt (and the speaker sees it).’
- b. Auditory  
 dKun.dg’as gzhas gtang gi ‘dug  
 Kunga song sing IPFV ‘dug  
 ‘Kunga is singing (and the speaker hears it).’
- c. Tactile  
 lug gi bal ‘di ‘jam.po ‘dug  
 sheep AGT/INST wool this soft ‘dug  
 ‘This sheep’s wool is soft (and the speaker feels it).’
- d. Gustatory  
 ja la tsha min ‘dug  
 tea OBL salt NEG ‘dug  
 ‘There is no salt in the tea (and the speaker tastes it).’
- e. Olfactory  
 spos de dri.ma zhim.po ‘dug  
 incense this smells good ‘dug  
 ‘This incense smells good (and the speaker smells it).’

As is seen in the description of what evidence is, in (36a), (36b), (36c), and (36e), the evidence proposition seems to correspond to the prejacent: in all these examples, the speaker perceives the event instantiating the prejacent (though the ways of perception differ). The extension requirement is satisfied if the prejacent and evidence proposition are identical, because minimal *p*-situations are contained in (or identical to) all extensions of all minimal situations in which *p* is true due to persistence. As for (36d), the evidence proposition seems different from the prejacent, because even if one tastes something and finds that it is not salty at all, she cannot know whether there is not salt in it or not; at the very least, we can safely say that the evidence proposition in (36d) is *the tea is not salty at all*. Although it is not clear whether the extension requirement is met, (36d) satisfies the abductive/causal requirement: the saltlessness of the tea is explained/caused by lack of salt in the tea. Thus, the proposed semantics of evidence can possibly be extended beyond indirect evidentials. Although its applicability is subject to future research, the semantics of evidence beyond evidence-types represents a perspective that has not been pursued by previous studies.

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