Discourse conditions for conditional perfection: Extending beyond QUDs[1]

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Abstract. This paper develops an account of conditional perfection (CP), the inference that strengthens conditionals from sufficiency (*if p, q*) to necessity and sufficiency (*if and only if p, q*). CP follows clear patterns across speech acts: it reliably occurs in inducements, varies in assertions, and is absent in advice (Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle, 2008). I argue that this distribution follows from two discourse conditions: (1) the Exhaustivity Condition (speakers provide complete specification of sufficient conditions) and (2) the Epistemic Authority Condition (speakers are well-positioned to make exhaustive claims). Unlike previous accounts that tie exhaustivity to Questions Under Discussion (von Fintel, 2001), I propose that speech acts themselves structure discourse to satisfy or block these conditions. Commitment-based conditionals impose asymmetric discourse structures that guarantee both conditions, thus reliably triggering CP. Assertions satisfy these conditions only in specific contexts, while advice systematically resists CP by identifying possibilities rather than necessities. This framework explains inconsistent experimental results with QUD manipulations (Cariani and Rips, 2023; Grusdt et al., 2023) and offers a more comprehensive understanding of how diverse communicative functions can shape pragmatic inferences beyond purely informational contexts.

Keywords: conditional perfection, discourse, exhaustivity, epistemic authority, inducements, advice, QUD, speech acts.

1. Introduction

In standard semantic analyses, conditionals express sufficiency; when p occurs, q follows. For example, the literal reading of (1) suggests that snowfall is a sufficient condition for train cancellations, but it does not imply that snowfall is a necessary cause for cancellation. That is, (1) is consistent with a world in which a general strike caused the train to be cancelled rather than snow:

(1) If there's a snowstorm, the trains will be cancelled.

However, in certain discourse contexts, hearers pragmatically infer that the stated condition is not only sufficient but also necessary. This strengthening of the conditional is known as *conditional perfection* (henceforth CP) (Geis and Zwicky, 1971). As illustrated in (2), (2a) is interpreted as equivalent to (2b): if the lawn is not mowed, the $40 will not be given. This, in turn, leads to the strengthened or 'perfected' interpretation in (2c), which states that the sole path to the outcome (*receiving $40*) is the stated condition (*mowing the lawn*):

(2) a. If you mow the lawn, I'll give you $40. $(p \rightarrow q)$
b. If you don't mow the lawn, I won't give you $40. $(\neg p \rightarrow \neg q)$
c. Only if you mow the lawn will I give you $40. $(p \leftrightarrow q)$

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Previous work has established that CP reliably arises in promises (2a), threats (3), or inducements (Fillenbaum, 1986; Ohm and Thompson, 2004),[2] varies in assertions, and is systematically absent in advice (Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle, 2008).

(3) If you keep talking, I'll tell everyone what you did.

When a conditional is used to assert or inform rather than to commit or induce, CP becomes variable and depends on specific contextual factors. For example, assertions such as (1) do not always trigger CP: whether they are interpreted biconditionally depends on factors in the specific context of utterance. Meanwhile, advice and other 'guidance-oriented' conditionals systematically resist CP (Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle, 2008). For example, (4) is seldom, if ever, understood as asserting that working hard is the only way to succeed; it merely suggests that working hard is one path to success:

(4) If you work hard, you'll succeed.

To account for this systematic distribution, I build on previous work by von Fintel (2001)[3] and propose that CP is an exhaustivity inference driven by general discourse conditions. I argue that this inference arises when two general discourse conditions are jointly met:[4]

1. THE EXHAUSTIVITY CONDITION: The discourse imposes a presumption of exhaustivity i.e., a pressure to provide an exhaustive statement.[5]

2. THE EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY CONDITION: The speaker is considered epistemically well-positioned to provide an exhaustive statement.

These two conditions – informativeness expectations [1] and speaker's epistemic authority over what they assert [2] – are discourse properties not unique to CP. However, taken together, both conditions can explain (i) why CP arises, (ii) when it is expected to arise, and importantly (iii) why it arises consistently in certain speech acts, variably in others or never in yet others.

Unlike previous accounts that derive the presumption of exhaustivity (Condition [1]) from Questions Under Discussion (von Fintel, 2001), my approach divorces exhaustivity from QUDs, arguing that exhaustivity demands can arise from multiple sources including speech act function; particularly with commitment-based conditionals that establish rather than describe relationships.

I argue that commitment-based speech acts, particularly inducements, reliably satisfy both conditions because they create a default expectation of exhaustivity: When a speaker makes a

[2]Inducements are speech acts that exert pressure on the hearer by either offering a benefit or imposing a consequence, thus influencing their actions. Conditional threats as well as promises can function as inducements: in a promise, if the hearer does p, the speaker commits to doing q; in a threat, if the hearer does p (or fails to do p), the speaker imposes a negative consequence, q.

[3]von Fintel (2001) himself builds on foundational work by Cornulier (1983) regarding the relationship between conditional perfection and exhaustivity.

[4]See Herburger (2016), who adopts a conjunction-based approach to exhaustification, where at least some exhaustified sentences are derived by conjoining the original sentence S with its alternative exhaustified form $OALT(S)$. While Herburger does not extensively address the contextual restrictions or conditions under which CP arises, she acknowledges it as a pragmatic phenomenon.

[5]This condition builds on Nadathur (2013), who similarly identified informational gap or *completeness* as a source of exhaustivity demand.

commitment, they are expected to be as informative as necessary to make the commitment interpretable by the addressee. Unlike assertions which describe existing relationships, commitments actively establish new relationships, effectively 'editing' rather than reporting reality. This creates higher stakes for informativeness, as addressees need complete information about conditions to rationally evaluate the newly established relationship. This asymmetry inherently satisfies Condition [1]. Furthermore, because commitments involve speaker control over outcomes, the speaker is epistemically privileged with respect to the conditional relationship,[6] reinforcing CP. This control creates a fundamental epistemic asymmetry: the speaker has privileged access to the conditions under which the commitment will be fulfilled, while the addressee lacks independent means to verify these conditions. This asymmetry inherently satisfies Condition [2].

In contrast, assertions exhibit variability because their exhaustivity demands are shaped by discourse-specific informational needs, which are negotiated rather than presumed. Advice and 'guidance-oriented' speech acts, meanwhile, systematically lack these pressures, which explains why CP is notably absent. This is because the pragmatic function of advice fundamentally works against the presumption of exhaustivity as advice inherently invites indicative reasoning about possibilities rather than exhaustive specification (Haigh et al., 2011). Moreover, when giving advice, a speaker typically lacks the epistemic authority that comes from the control of the speaker over the outcome, which means that CP is even less likely to follow.

This proposal addresses a gap in previous work that has largely operated under the tacit assumption that the primary goal of discourse is information sharing. Although rarely stated explicitly, this assumption has led to a narrow focus on how inferences, including but not limited to CP, arise in discourse overlooking the broader range of communicative functions language serves. My account complements this view by recognizing that discourse often serves purposes beyond information exchange, such as persuasion, advice, and inducements, and that these functions directly shape discourse expectations in ways that influence pragmatic inferences. This account can also explain why experiments that focus solely on QUD manipulations have produced inconsistent results in the derivation of CP (Cariani and Rips, 2023; Grusdt et al., 2023): Such studies have addressed one driver of CP and, more specifically, only one component of that driver (i.e., Condition [1] and QUDs). Recognizing the diverse functions of Language and their influence on pragmatic reasoning, my approach provides a unified and predictive explanation for the distribution of CP across speech acts.

2. The exhaustivity condition

I define the *presumption of exhaustivity* as a discourse expectation that speakers will specify all relevant conditions under which the consequent holds. Under this presumption, conditionals are interpreted as providing complete rather than partial specifications of sufficient conditions for the consequent. This condition is paramount to deriving the inference that the stated condition is the only path to the outcome in line with the reasoning pattern in (2a). However, I argue that the presumption of exhaustivity alone is insufficient to explain the systematic distribution of CP. Rather, both this condition and the Epistemic Authority Condition (discussed in Section 3)

[6]Privileged epistemic access to future actions does not imply omniscience but rather a relative epistemic advantage over other discourse participants.

must be jointly satisfied for CP to arise.

This approach to the Exhaustivity Condition, however, diverges from previous accounts in how it conceptualizes the source of exhaustivity by divorcing the presumption of exhaustivity from Questions Under Discussion (QUDs). For instance, von Fintel (2001) argues that CP arises when a conditional answers a question seeking all sufficient conditions for the consequent as in (5):

(5) Under which conditions will *q* occur?

Nadathur (2013) suggests CP is triggered when conditionals are taken to respond to polar questions about the consequent as in (6):

(6) Will *q* happen?

Both approaches build on Roberts (2012)'s view that discourse is organized around questions, and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984)'s observation that answers to questions are often interpreted exhaustively. The idea then is that if a conditional like (7c) is taken as answering an implicit or explicit question in line with (7a) or (7b), we should expect (7c) to be interpreted as (7d):

(7) a. Under what circumstances will the trains be cancelled?
b. Will the trains be cancelled?
c. If there's a snowstorm, the trains will be cancelled.
d. Only if there's a snowstorm will the trains be cancelled.

Although I acknowledge that QUDs can and do create exhaustivity demands, I argue that such demands also arise from other sources. Particularly relevant for CP is how speech acts influence the presumption of exhaustivity independently of the QUD. Commitment-based speech acts, such as inducements in (8), are constitutive in nature; they actively build or establish relationships between a condition and an outcome.

(8) a. If you finish grading today, I'll take you to the movies tonight. (promise)
b. If you keep talking, I'll tell everyone what you did. (threat)
c. If you join before Sunday, you'll get 15% off your subscription. (offer)

This 'world-editing' function creates inherent exhaustivity demands: when a speaker establishes a commitment, the addressee expects complete information about the conditions under which that commitment holds. This inherent presumption of exhaustivity in commitment-based conditionals can be explained through the principles of cooperativeness under Grice's Maxims. In commitment-based contexts, the first Maxim of Quantity (making your contribution as informative as required) becomes particularly stringent. Additionally, the Maxim of Manner (be clear) plays a crucial role. Consider the following:

(9) If you help me clean up, I'll drive you to the station, #but I can't tell you what other conditions will lead me to drive you.

The pragmatic oddity of (9) arises because commitment-based conditionals impose the expectation that a cooperative, sincere speaker would not deliberately refuse to disclose conditions relevant to their offer. By withholding such conditions, a speaker prevents the hearer from properly evaluating the commitment, violating both the Maxim of Quantity (informativeness) and

the Maxim of Manner (clarity), thus severely undermining the speech act's felicity conditions.

Another piece of evidence for the higher requirement on informativeness in such contexts is the inability to retroactively modify commitments without it sounding pragmatically odd:

(10) A: If you help me clean up, I'll drive you to the station. [Later] A: #Oh, I forgot to mention, I would have also driven you if you had run errands for me.

The oddness of (10) is due to the expectation of exhaustivity in commitments. Once a commitment is established, speakers cannot felicitously expand it without violating the addressee's default assumption that all conditions were initially specified.

Notably, the same withholding of information in informational contexts does not create the same infelicity:

(11) If it rains, the train will be late, but I can't tell you what other factors will also cause a delay.

This contrast occurs because in informational contexts, Grice's second Maxim of Quantity (do not make your contribution more informative than required) tempers exhaustivity demands. Speakers only need to provide *enough* information relevant to *current* discourse goals. In fact, excessive informativeness would be pragmatically inappropriate. However, in commitment contexts, complete specification is inherently expected for the speech act to succeed.

The relationship between exhaustivity demands and speech acts helps explain why inducements systematically trigger CP, even when QUD-based accounts would predict otherwise. Consider this exchange:

(12) a. Al: Why make you coffee?
b. Bo: (Because), if you make me coffee, I'll give you a cookie. [7]

According to QUD-based accounts (von Fintel, 2001), CP should arise when a conditional is taken to exhaustively answer a question about the conditions for a given outcome. The question in (12a) is not seeking such information. Instead, it asks what follows from a single condition (*making coffee*). However, a question more in line with (13) would be expected to trigger CP under the QUD-based exhaustification account:

(13) Al: Under what conditions will you give me a cookie?

With (13) seeking information on the conditions under which cookie giving will take place, the conditional in (12b) will be interpreted as eliminating all unmentioned conditions to obtain a cookie, leading the addressee to the conclusion that *only* coffee making will result in cookie getting. However, judgment data show that native English speakers will perfect a conditional like (12b) as exhaustive even in a context where an explicit QUD is *not* seeking information about the conditions to an outcome. Take the following:

(14) a. Al: Why would I make you coffee? (*why p?*)

[7] As pointed by Aron Hirsch (p.c.), some might argue that an alternative, implicit QUD (similar to (13)) could explain why (12) leads to CP under a QUD-based exhaustivity account. However, the felicitous use of the explicit 'because' in the conditional response suggests that the actual question being answered is indeed the explicit one in (12a).

b. Bo: (Because), if you make me coffee, I'll give you a cookie. (*if p, q*)
c. CONTEXT: Al did not make coffee for Bo. ($\neg p$)
d. QUESTION: Did Bo give Al a cookie?

I presented this scenario to fourteen native English-speaking informants, most of whom answered 'no' when asked the question in (14d).[8] Answering in the negative in the context presented in (14) indicates that the speakers interpreted the conditional as biconditional, inferring that since Al did not make coffee ($\neg p$), Bo did not give Al a cookie ($\neg q$). This reasoning pattern supports the interpretation in (15):[9]

(15) Only if you make me coffee will I give you a cookie.

This, I argue, provides some evidence that inducements trigger CP even with nonexhaustive QUDs, supporting the claim that the speech act itself − and not just QUD-determined informational requirements − creates a presumption of exhaustivity.

3. The epistemic authority condition

The second condition necessary for CP is that the speaker must be viewed as epistemically capable of providing an exhaustive statement. This condition concerns the speaker's perceived authority and ability to specify all relevant conditions.

One consistent source of epistemic authority is the speaker's control over the outcome: when speakers have control over whether the consequent occurs, they are assumed to have privileged epistemic access to the conditions under which that outcome will happen.[10] In promises and threats, the speaker typically controls the consequent directly:

(16) If you finish grading today, I'll take you to the movies tonight.

In (16), because the speaker controls the outcome (taking the addressee to the movies), they are assumed to have privileged access to the conditions under which this will happen. This control creates a strong epistemic position and creates a fundamental epistemic asymmetry between the speaker and the addressee.[11] The addressee cannot independently verify the conditions under which the speaker will act. Although in commitment-based speech acts this asymmetry is inherent, assertions often involve more symmetrical epistemic access, as both discourse participants may have comparable access to the relevant knowledge. This symmetry in the case of informational or assertive conditionals explains why assertions less reliably satisfy Condition [2]: the speaker's ability to be exhaustive becomes contextually dependent rather than 'structurally' guaranteed by the speech act.

[8]Eleven out of fourteen informants answered 'no,' the remaining three answered 'I don't know.'
[9]This methodology follows Cariani and Rips (2023), who use the fallacies of *affirming the consequent* and *denying the antecedent* as proxies for evaluating conditional perfection.
[10]See 6
[11]While speaker control is the primary source of epistemic authority discussed in this paper, other factors such as expertise and privileged access to information can also contribute. For example, an engineer discussing the combustion engine or a committee chair explaining procedures will possess epistemic authority without direct control. However, these factors are contextually determined, unlike speaker control, which I argue is consistently present in inducement-type conditionals.

This epistemic asymmetry manifests itself in observable discourse patterns that distinguish commitments from informational conditionals. Consider the following:

(17) a. Al: If you help me clean up, I'll drive you to the station.
b. Bo: #Actually, you will also drive me if I wash the dog.

Bo's response is pragmatically odd, specifically because Bo lacks the epistemic authority to make claims about Al's commitments. Since Al alone controls the outcome and knows the conditions under which he will act, Bo cannot legitimately contradict Al's statement. This contrasts with assertions in informational contexts:

(18) a. A: If it rains next week, the school trip will be cancelled.
b. B: Actually, (I heard) they'll also cancel if not enough parents sign up to be chaperones.

When the speaker and the addressee have comparable epistemic access to the facts, as in (18), the corrections are pragmatically felicitous. I argue that this contrast is evidence for the special epistemic status of speakers in commitment contexts.[12]

This special kind of epistemic authority of the speaker vis-à-vis the addressee systematically satisfies Condition [2] by creating a context of epistemic superiority and asymmetry between the speaker and the addressee. When combined with Condition [1], this creates the perfect environment for CP to arise. The combination of these two conditions explains why CP occurs systematically in inducements, but varies in assertions.

4. Explaining CP distribution across speech acts

In this section, I demonstrate how the two conditions discussed in Section 2 and Section 3 can explain the systematic distribution of CP between different types of speech act. I show how commitment-based conditionals reliably satisfy both conditions, why assertions exhibit variable CP patterns depending on context, and why advice conditionals consistently fail to meet these conditions.

4.1. Commitment-based conditionals: Systematic CP

As we have already seen, commitment-based conditionals (promises, threats, offers and inducements) systematically trigger CP. We explain this pattern as follows: These speech acts inherently and 'structurally' satisfy both conditions by virtue of their basic discourse function.

Experimental work confirms the reliability of CP in inducements (Fillenbaum, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1986; Markovits and Lesage, 1990; Newstead et al., 1997; Zevakhina and Prigorkina, 2020). For example, Fillenbaum (1986) found that participants consistently endorsed *denial of the antecedent* inferences (inferring $\neg q$ from $\neg p$) for conditional promises and threats. I argue that this consistency is evidence that the structural properties of inducements play a role

[12]To the same point, addressees must negotiate alternatives explicitly rather than assert alternatives:
(i) a. Al: If you help me clean up, I'll drive you to the station.
b. Bo: What about if I help you wash the dog instead?
In (i), Bo must frame the alternative as a question or proposal rather than an assertion because of Al's epistemic authority over the conditions of her commitment.

in CP rather than merely local contextual factors. Indeed, the resistance of inducements to context manipulation is particularly notable. Even when QUD manipulations would predict the absence of CP (as in my coffee cookie example in (12)), inducements still reliably trigger CP. This pattern presents a challenge for a QUD-based account but follows naturally from the dual discourse conditions approach (exhaustivity and epistemic authority) presented in this paper.

Although CP is highly reliable in inducements, the so-called 'contingent offers' or promises to assist present an interesting case:[13]

(19) If it rains, I'll pick you up from the train station.

In (19), while the speaker controls their action (picking up the addressee), the antecedent condition (rain) is beyond the control of anyone. Such contingent offers generate weaker CP effects because they partially undermine the first condition. Since the addressee cannot control whether the antecedent occurs, there is reduced pressure for the speaker to exhaustively specify all conditions under which they'll provide assistance. The primary communicative function here is not to incentivize an action (as with typical inducements), but to offer help under specific circumstances, reducing the actionability pressure that drives exhaustivity demands in standard inducements.

This example shows that this account can correctly explain borderline cases based on the degree to which both conditions are satisfied. When either condition is partially undermined – in this case, the exhaustivity demand – CP effects may be lowered.

4.2. Informational/assertive conditionals: Variable CP

Unlike inducements, conditional assertions exhibit significant variability in whether they trigger CP (Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle, 2008). The account presented in this paper predicts this pattern: assertions satisfy the two conditions only in specific contexts, not by default. When both (i) exhaustivity demands are established and (ii) the speaker is recognized as epistemically capable of being exhaustive, CP will arise; otherwise, it will not.

Consider the following conditional:

(20) If it snows, the trains will be cancelled.

When uttered as a casual observation by a commuter, for example, (20) carries no inherent requirement to list all possible causes of train cancellations: the conversational context is unlikely to create a presumption of exhaustivity and the speaker likely lacks complete knowledge. However, this same conditional may yield a different interpretation in contexts where both conditions are satisfied:

(21) a. Senator: Do you expect there will be train cancellations this winter?
b. Railway CEO: If it snows, trains will be cancelled.
c. Senator: So you are saying that under no other conditions you expect train cancellations?
d. Railway CEO: Yes, that is correct.

Here, both conditions are satisfied. First, high-stakes government testimony in (21) (and ex-

[13] Thanks to Alexander Williams (p.c.) for bringing up this example.

plicit QUD) creates a strong demand for exhaustivity. Second, as CEO of the railway company, the speaker is assumed to have the epistemic authority to make exhaustive statements about train cancellations. The felicity of the CEO's confirmation in (21d) demonstrates that the same conditional as in (20) can indeed be interpreted biconditionally exactly as we would expect under the dual-condition account.

4.3. Conditional advice and guidance-conditionals: Systematic absence of CP

Conditional advice consistently resists CP (Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle, 2008). For example:

(22) a. If you run often, you'll improve your cardiovascular health.
b. If you sleep more, you'll feel better.
c. If you diversify your portfolio, you'll reduce your risk of losing all your investments.

Hearers rarely infer that running is the *only* way to improve cardiovascular health, that more sleep is the only path to feeling better, or that diversification is the only risk reduction strategy. This systematic absence of CP reflects the inherent failure of conditional advice to satisfy my two conditions.

This is in part because a conditional advice does not come with the same pragmatic pressure as commitment-based speech acts; by their nature, advice are taken to express sufficient conditions, not exhaustive ones thus failing systematically to satisfy Condition [1].

(23) a. A: If you run often, you'll improve your cardiovascular health.
b. A: Swimming or walking regularly will also improve your cardiovascular health.

The natural compatibility of advice with explicit alternative suggestions, as in (23), contrasts sharply with the infelicity of such patterns in inducements, as we saw in Section 2.[14] This reflects the fundamental orientation of advice toward possibility rather than necessity in line with systematically failing to satisfy Condition [1].

Furthermore, previous work has found that in advice, the speaker usually does not have direct control over the outcome ((Ohm and Thompson, 2004). This makes satisfying condition [2] less likely. Note the contrast when manipulating for speaker control in (24):

(24) a. If you practice daily for a week, you'll improve your skills. [Advice framing]
b. If you practice daily for a week, I'll give you $50. [Inducement framing]

Despite identical antecedents, (24a) received consistently weaker CP readings than (24b).[15]

5. Speech acts and discourse asymmetries: The structural satisfaction of CP conditions

Conditional Perfection patterns reveal how speech acts can shape discourse dynamics. Certain speech acts, particularly inducements, inherently alter the symmetry of discourse, directly influencing pragmatic inference patterns. In this section, I show how speech acts can create

[14] See footnote (i) for contrast.
[15] Based on judgements gathered from native English speakers.

discourse structures that inherently satisfy or fail to satisfy the Exhaustivity Condition and the Epistemic Authority Condition, regardless of particular contextual factors like QUDs or common ground.

Speech acts do more than perform different functions; they establish distinct discourse structures with unique speaker-hearer dynamics. These structural differences systematically affect the conditions necessary for pragmatic inferences such as CP. Specifically, inducements transform discourse dynamics by introducing two key asymmetries:

1. **Relevance Asymmetry** (directly satisfies the Exhaustivity Condition): In inducements, the speaker unilaterally determines which conditions are relevant and which alternatives matter. This asymmetry is structurally imposed by the speech act itself, not contextually negotiated.
2. **Epistemic Asymmetry** (directly satisfies the Epistemic Authority Condition): In inducements, the speaker has inherent privileged access to the conditions under which they will fulfill their commitment. This asymmetry is a necessary feature of the speech act.

These asymmetries explain why inducements satisfy both conditions systematically and structurally for CP, independently of specific contextual cues such as QUDs. The speech act itself imposes the discourse conditions that trigger CP. In contrast, assertions maintain symmetric discourse dynamics, requiring specific contextual support for CP to arise:

Table 1. A comparison of discourse dynamics in inducements and assertions.

Speech Act	**Relevance Dynamic**	**Epistemic Dynamic**
Inducements	*Structurally asymmetric:* Speaker unilaterally determines which conditions are relevant	*Structurally asymmetric:* Speaker has inherent privileged access to commitment conditions
Assertions	*Inherently symmetric:* Relevance is contextually negotiated between participants	*Inherently symmetric:* Epistemic authority depends on specific contextual factors

This contrast explains the systematic variability in CP. For assertions, both conditions for CP can be satisfied, but only through specific contextual cues that happen to meet the necessary conditions. In contrast, inducements inherently alter discourse dynamics, naturally leading to CP.

More broadly, this analysis challenges the focus on QUDs as the fundamental or main discourse organizing principles driving pragmatic inference. It highlights the need to consider how speech acts systematically shape discourse dynamics when explaining pragmatic phenomena like CP.

6. Conclusion

This paper presented an account of Conditional Perfection, explaining its systematic distribution across speech acts. Using two key conditions, (i) the Exhaustivity Condition [1] and (ii) The Epistemic Authority Condition [2] – I was able to provide a unified explanation that maintains full explanatory adequacy.

There are three main interconnected takeaways. First, speech acts fundamentally shape discourse dynamics, influencing pragmatic inferences in predictable ways. In particular, inducements exhibit two key asymmetries: (i) *relevance asymmetry* which gives speakers unilateral authority to determine which conditions matter in the context, while assertions involve a more symmetric negotiation of relevance and (ii) *epistemic asymmetry* which grants speakers privileged access to conditions, while assertions typically involve more balanced epistemic access between participants.

Second, my account divorces exhaustivity-based inferences from Questions Under Discussion (QUDs), showing that other aspects of discourse, such as speaker-hearer dynamics, can influence whether a presumption of exhaustivity arises.

Lastly, I showed how the diverse communicative functions of Language (e.g., committing, informing, advising) can create distinct discourse structures with unique speaker-addressee dynamics and that pragmatic inferences cannot therefore be reduced to contextually sensitive factors like QUDs. Recognizing how speech acts inherently alter discourse dynamics provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding pragmatic phenomena like CP. In summary, my dual discourse conditions approach (exhaustivity and epistemic authority) presented in this paper provides a principled explanation for the systematic variability of CP across speech acts while retaining a uniform explanation for the CP inference.

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